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7.6% per Hour in Information. Capital Was 2.7 Points. TFP Was 1.9.

Total factor productivity rose in 7 of 19 industries in 2025. Of information's 7.6% gain per hour, capital intensity is 2.7 points and TFP is 1.9.

A night warehouse with shrink-wrapped cartons on a pallet and a dark aisle of server racks glowing at the far end.

7.6 percent.

Labor productivity in information rose 7.6 percent in 2025, the fastest of 19 major industries in Table 4, and that row splits the hour into a total-factor-productivity residual of 1.9 percentage points, capital intensity of 2.7, labor composition of 0.1, energy intensity of 0.0, materials intensity of 0.3, and services intensity of 2.4, which add to 7.4 and sit 0.2 point under the printed 7.6.

Capital is the largest piece.

Shares below use 7.4, the sum the cells actually make: capital intensity is 2.7 divided by 7.4, or 36.5 percent, services intensity is 32.4 percent, and the residual is 25.7 percent. Divide by the printed hour instead and 1.9 divided by 7.6 is 0.25 exactly, while 2.7 divided by 7.6 is 35.5 percent. On November 20, 2026, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the residual rose in 7 of 19 industries (USDL-26-1714; the PDF matches), and 7 divided by 19 is 36.8 percent. Explaining a split of 2019-25, the release points at investment in what it calls "super intelligence (also known as artificial intelligence) tools," and it already says capital intensity was the largest contribution to the 7.6 percent hour. Counting every industry whose hour rose, the residual is strictly the largest of the six sources in four: wholesale trade, finance and insurance, real estate and rental and leasing, and professional and technical services. Finance is on that list, and information is not.

What moved underneath the hour

Table 1 is the quantity account: information output rose 7.3 percent, the largest output gain in the table, combined inputs rose 5.3 percent, and 7.3 minus 5.3 is 2.0, a tenth above the printed residual, while capital input rose 6.5 percent, the largest capital-input gain there, labor input rose 0.3 percent, and the gap between those growth rates is 6.2 percentage points. Table 2 splits the 7.8 percent intermediate-input gain into energy down 3.1 percent, materials up 5.2 percent, and services up 8.6 percent, so services input outran the 6.5 percent capital-input gain. Table 3 is the price form the release defines as combined-input price over output price, with methods in the handbook chapter it cites: 2.4 minus 0.5 is 1.9 and matches the residual, while 7.8 minus 5.3 is 2.5, a tenth above the printed input price. On the printed 7.6, 100 divided by 1.076 is 92.9, so a bundle that took 100 hours in 2024 takes 92.9 hours at the 2025 rate. The cut is 7.1 hours, and 1.9 divided by 7.6, which is exactly a quarter, assigns 1.8 of those hours to the residual.

Arithmetic on printed cells from BLS USDL-26-1714, November 20, 2026. Labor-productivity sources are Table 4. Quantity changes are Table 1. Prices are Table 3. Private-business contributions are the release text. Shares of 7.4 use the sum of information's six printed sources, because that sum is 7.4 and the printed hour is 7.6.
ReadingPrinted cellArithmetic on the printed cells
Information, six sources of the hourLabor productivity 7.61.9 + 2.7 + 0.1 + 0.0 + 0.3 + 2.4 = 7.4. Then 2.7/7.4 = 36.5 percent, 2.4/7.4 = 32.4 percent, 1.9/7.4 = 25.7 percent
Information, residual as a share of the printed hour1.9 of 7.61.9/7.6 = 0.25 exactly. Capital's share of that same hour is 2.7/7.6 = 35.5 percent
Information, quantity identityTFP 1.9; output 7.3; inputs 5.37.3 − 5.3 = 2.0, a tenth above 1.9. Capital input 6.5 minus labor input 0.3 = 6.2 percentage points
Information, price identityInput price 2.4; output price 0.52.4 − 0.5 = 1.9, matching TFP. Output cost 7.8 − output 7.3 = 0.5. Input cost 7.8 − inputs 5.3 = 2.5, a tenth above 2.4
Wholesale trade, the TFP leaderTFP 3.7; output 1.8; inputs −1.81.8 − (−1.8) = 3.6, a tenth under 3.7. Hour sources 3.7 + 1.0 + 0.1 + 0 − 0.4 − 1.4 = 3.0 exactly
Private business, 2019-25TFP 0.85; capital 1.08; labor 0.51Sum 2.44. Capital is 1.08/2.44 = 44.3 percent. TFP is 0.85/2.44 = 34.8 percent. Labor is 20.9 percent

Wholesale led the residual by using fewer inputs

Wholesale trade led the 2025 residual, at 3.7 percent, because output rose 1.8 percent while combined inputs fell 1.8 percent, and 1.8 minus negative 1.8 is 3.6, a tenth under the print. Materials input fell 20.3 percent, services input fell 4.5 percent, and energy input fell 3.2 percent, and the input-output tables the notes name do not say those materials were merchandise. The six sources of the wholesale hour add to the printed 3.0, and the residual is larger than the hour because services intensity is negative 1.4.

Twelve industries recorded a lower residual, including retail trade at negative 2.3 percent and manufacturing at negative 1.2 percent, the latter on output down 1.3 percent and capital input up 2.4 percent. Other services, except government, was negative 2.6 percent, and 1.5 minus 4.1 equals that print. Counting Table 3 also reproduces the release's 12 industries where output prices rose faster than input prices. Agriculture's hour was 5.6 percent, second to information, and its six sources add to 5.4, the same 0.2 gap, with a residual of only 0.7.

Strictly largest of the six Table 4 sources, for industries whose labor productivity rose in 2025. Information is the only such industry in which that source is capital intensity. Manufacturing is shown because its hour fell while capital input rose. Points are percentage points.
IndustryLabor productivityStrictly largest sourceThat sourceTFP
Information7.6%Capital intensity2.71.9
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting5.6%Services intensity1.60.7
Professional and technical services3.8%TFP1.91.9
Wholesale trade3.0%TFP3.73.7
Finance and insurance1.9%TFP1.31.3
Real estate and rental and leasing0.7%TFP1.91.9
Manufacturing−0.4%Hour fell; capital input rose 2.4%1.0 capital intensity−1.2

Across six years, capital still outruns the residual

Private-business output growth is the sum of the residual, capital, and labor: for 2019-25 the printed contributions are 0.85, 1.08, and 0.51, which add to 2.44, so capital is 44.3 percent of that sum, the residual 34.8 percent, and labor 20.9 percent. Split where the release splits: 2019-22 adds to 2.35 from 0.72, 1.03, and 0.60, and 2022-25 adds to 2.52 from 0.97, 1.13, and 0.42, so the residual's contribution rose 0.25 point, capital's rose 0.10, and labor's fell 0.18. Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 use a technology bundle that is not the information industry in Table 1: the notes build it from computer and electronic products (NAICS 334), broadcasting and telecommunications (515 and 517), data processing, internet publishing, and other information services (518 and 519), and computer systems design (5415), leaving other publishing and motion pictures out. That bundle's residual contribution went from 0.27 to 0.42, and 0.15 divided by 0.25 is 60 percent of the rise in the residual's contribution; over 2019-25 it is 0.35 of 0.85, or 41.2 percent, and 0.25 of 1.08, or 23.1 percent.

Four sector residuals for 2019-25, negative 0.01 plus 0.35 plus 0.30 plus 0.20, sum to 0.84 against a top line of 0.85, and the four capital rows sum to 1.07 against 1.08, which is the footnote's warning that contributions may not sum. Longer series are at the productivity tables. Labor's contribution fell from 0.60 to 0.42, and the bundle's labor contribution fell from 0.11 to negative 0.02, so 0.13 divided by 0.18 is 72.2 percent of that drop, while the four sector labor changes sum to negative 0.17. Health care and social assistance moved the other way, from 0.07 to 0.17, the 0.10-point offset the release already names.

What You Can Do

If a note quotes a productivity boom in tech, ask which object it means: a 7.6 percent hour in information is a 2025 rate for NAICS 51, and capital intensity is 2.7 of the points that add to 7.4, while a 0.35-point contribution from the technology bundle is a six-year share of private-business output growth, not a 2025 rate, and not that industry. If you buy software or cloud capacity, information's output quantity rose 7.3 percent while its output price rose 0.5 percent, so the hour did not arrive as a 7.6 percent price cut. If you work in manufacturing or retail, the 2025 residuals are negative 1.2 percent and negative 2.3 percent. In the next annual release, watch whether information's capital-intensity point stays above its residual, and whether wholesale trade is still leading the residual while materials input falls.

Limitations

This does not prove that a model failed, that any named firm's spending was wasted, or what one workplace produced. Total factor productivity is the growth left after measured capital, labor, energy, materials, and services, so it absorbs unused capacity and mismeasured inputs. Rounded tenths miss printed totals by 0.1 or 0.2, including 7.4 against 7.6, and the release's significance tests use unrounded data we do not have. Manufacturing output for 2025 follows historical relationships with Federal Reserve industrial production, some service output uses the Census Bureau Quarterly Services Survey, and hours follow the November 5, 2026 Productivity and Costs preliminary release, USDL-26-1631, on the schedule and the archive. That quarterly nonfarm rate is a different object, and this article does not use it. Capital comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, inventories from IRS corporation returns, and farm land from the Department of Agriculture, as the notes state, and none of those sources names a model. One year is a short window. Goods-producing rows in Tables 5 through 7 exclude computer and electronic products, so they are not the manufacturing row in Table 1.

The Strongest Case Against This Analysis

Grant the objection its full strength. Information had the fastest hour and the fastest output gain, 7.3 percent, with an output price up only 0.5 percent, and 100 hours of that output compress to 92.9, while the technology bundle contributed 0.35 of the 0.85 residual points over 2019-25 and 60 percent of the later rise in that contribution. Capital intensity is where equipment and software show up once they are counted as capital, so treating a smaller residual as a missing technology effect contradicts the release's definition: the residual is what remains after capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. A 2.7-point capital contribution can be the technology. Four industries did put the residual first, and 7 of 19 raised it.

Count the other lines.

That case is right about the output, the price, and the 60 percent share, and incomplete about 2025: the information hour's largest printed source is capital intensity at 2.7, then services intensity at 2.4, then the residual at 1.9, and the six sources add to 7.4. Wholesale trade led the residual at 3.7 percent by cutting inputs, including a 20.3 percent drop in materials, on output up only 1.8 percent. Twelve industries had a lower residual. Embodied capital can be the true channel and still leave the residual smaller than the capital line.

The Bottom Line

Read the 7.6 percent as an hour, then read the column under it: capital intensity is 2.7 points, services intensity is 2.4, and the residual is 1.9, on capital input up 6.5 percent and labor input up 0.3 percent, and 100 hours of information-industry output compress to 92.9. Across 2019-25, capital still contributes more to private-business output growth than the residual does, 1.08 points against 0.85, inside a three-part sum of 2.44 once labor's 0.51 is included, and the technology bundle is 0.35 of that 0.85. The 2025 leader on the residual itself is wholesale trade, at 3.7 percent, because inputs fell.

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